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A
fter six decades of evolution, U.S. agricul-
tural policy may be about to enter a revolu-
tion. Ever since farm programs were
created in the 1930s, farm policy has generally
evolved along predictable lines. To be sure, over the
past decade policy has tended to move in a market
direction, but the goals and policy instruments re-
main amazingly akin to those put in place during
the Great Depression. Now, federal fiscal discipline
may do the unthinkable—force the nation to rethink
an antiquated farm policy and replace it with a much
leaner, more targeted policy to answer the nation’s
food needs for the next century. 
While the federal budget may force this policy
change, economics is likely to justify it. The agri-
cultural industry for which past policy goals and
programs were designed is long gone. Yesterday’s
small farms have grown into today’s commer-
cial operations. Yesterday’s domestic food market
has evolved into today’s global supermarket. And
a rural America once dominated by barns and silos
has been transformed into a diversified rural econ-
omy. In short, the policy of the past no longer
works with an industry of the future.
With the budget forcing change and economics
supporting it, the question is, where should agri-
cultural policy go? Debate on the 1995 farm bill
has focused almost entirely on the budget, while
neglecting the more important question. A new
vision for agricultural policy is lacking, mainly
because current arguments center on whether to
maintain the status quo. But the status quo is
unlikely to stand. Rather, the future of agricultural
policy lies in the pursuit of four key goals: com-
peting in world food markets, improving the
nation’s diet, conserving the nation’s natural re-
sources, and increasing economic opportunity in
rural America. In combination, these goals will
encourage continued growth in the agricultural
sector, enhance the welfare of consumers, and
have the added benefit of requiring considerably
less government involvement than in the past.
This article outlines a new vision for U.S. agricul-
tural policy. The first section reviews the budget
imperative that is forcing the debate. The second
section presents economic arguments that justify
a redirection of policy. The final section explores
four goals that mark the way to a new policy.
THE BUDGET IMPERATIVE
Agricultural policymakers have always had to
work within budget parameters, but normally those
parameters have required little change in programs.
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the article.Today, writers of the 1995 farm bill are facing a
budget imperative driven by plans to balance the
federal budget by 2002.
Before considering the budget targets that now
confront Congressional writers of agricultural
policy, it is useful to look at how the farm bill’s
money is spent. While many may think it covers
only programs directly tied to production agricul-
ture, the farm bill reaches all the way to an assort-
ment of consumer food programs.
The farm bill is actually many pieces of legislation
held together under a broad umbrella. One way to
illustrate the bill’s many facets is to review the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s annual budget.
Setting aside the Forest Service, a large agency
administered in the USDA but whose spending is
overseen by the House and Senate Interior Commit-
tees, it is evident that farm and food programs
dominate (Chart 1). Food programs account for
nearly two-thirds of department spending. These
programs include food stamps, Women-Infants-
and-Children (WIC), and school lunches. Farm
programs, mainly price support programs for a
handful of commodities, account for nearly a fifth
of USDA spending. The smaller programs that
round out USDA spending include conservation
programs, including the Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram, government-sponsored agricultural research,
and rural development. With most farm bill dollars
going to food and farm programs, therefore, it is
Source:  USDA 1996 Budget Summary.




Food programs  $38.8 billion
(65.8%)
Other  $2.8 billion
(4.7%)
Research  $1.4 billion
(2.4%)
Conservation  $3.2 billion
(5.4%)
Rural development  $28.8 billion
(3.7%)
Farm programs  $10.6 billion
(18.0%)
64 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYnot surprising that a legislative battle is brewing
over whether spending cuts will come at the ex-
pense of farmers or consumers.
The budget targets now being suggested will re-
quire substantial cuts in overall spending in the farm
bill. The House and Senate Budget Committees
have called for cuts of up to 20 percent over the next
seven years. The Budget Committees establish a
budget target, but the Agriculture Committees must
then decide how the farm bill will be changed to
meet that target. Thus, the cuts could come all in farm
programs, all in food programs, or in combination.
How severe are the proposed spending cuts?
If left unchanged, the farm program portion of
the farm bill is projected by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) to cost $10 billion a year,
or a total of $50 billion over the next five years
(Chart 2). The Senate Budget Resolution recom-
mends that spending on farm programs be cut $8
billion (16 percent) over five years, but the only
requirement is that combined cuts in farm and
food programs total $29 billion. The House Budget
Resolution calls for $8 billion over five years,
and total cuts of $26 billion. Both the Senate and
the House require much bigger cuts in the final
two years of the seven-year budget period. Total
cuts in farm and food programs during the
seven-year period total $44 to 48 billion, with
farm programs accounting for an estimated $13
billion.
6
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 65The stage is set, therefore, for substantial cuts in
farm bill spending and a pitched battle over how
to make the cuts. Although defenders of the cur-
rent programs will try to hit the budget target
through minor adjustments in program parame-
ters, the cuts are big enough to require a more
fundamental reworking of the programs. 
THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE
Faced with the tough job of balancing the federal
budget, policymakers will scrutinize government
spending on agriculture more carefully than ever
before. While the roughly $60 billion spent on
food and agriculture programs each year is less
than 2 percent of the federal budget, the budget
imperative dictates a fundamental rethinking of
why and how this money is spent. What are the
nation’s goals for its farm policy? And are those
goals still valid for an industry that has undergone
such big economic changes over time?
Answers to these questions lead to the conclu-
sion that the old farm policy goals have not kept
pace with a changing farm economy. The eco-
nomic changes call into question not only the
nation’s policy goals but also the programs built
over the past six decades to achieve them.
The old goals
The nation’s traditional goals for farm policy
hinge on the view that agriculture is a unique
industry, deserving of special consideration—
and appropriation. The industry’s unique status
harks back to the days when farmers were largely
self-reliant, purchasing relatively little and sell-
ing only the small amount produced in excess of
farm family consumption.
1 Rather than a business,
farming in many respects was regarded as a
unique way of life, summarized in the Jeffer-
sonian ideal, “Those who labor in the earth are
the chosen people of God, if ever He had a chosen
people. . .” (Tweeten). 
A review of the past few farm bills produces a
list of four main policy goals. In each case, the
goals have been part of farm bill preambles for
nearly 60 years.
Provide food security. The view that agriculture
has special status is rooted in the industry’s pri-
mary endeavor of producing food, one of society’s
most basic needs. Thus, first and foremost among
the traditional farm policy goals has been provid-
ing the nation a secure food supply.
Given food’s fundamental importance, food
security seems an appropriate goal for farm policy.
Indeed, food security remains a prominent goal
in the current policy debate. Congress has explic-
itly suggested that one aim of the new farm bill
should be to ensure an abundant supply of food
for American consumers. The need for stating
such a goal is unclear, however, because for a long
time U.S. agriculture’s chief problem has been man-
aging a chronic surplus of food, not rationing
scarcity.
2
Notwithstanding a stated goal of food security,
farm policy has been concerned mostly with curbing
surpluses. Farm commodity programs have con-
trolled excess production by idling farmland and
have supported market prices by storing surplus
grain in government-controlled reserves. Ideally,
by astutely managing the number of acres farmers
are allowed to plant each year, policymakers can
limit  excess production and stabilize grain re-
serves at a comfortable level, thus reducing sur-
pluses while still achieving food security. 
Unpredictable weather, however, can foil policy-
makers’ carefully laid plans. For example, after
wet weather slashed U.S. crop production and
shrank grain reserves in 1993, policymakers encour-
aged farmers to plant as many acres as possible in
1994 to rebuild inventories. With the bigger acre-
age—and unexpectedly ideal weather—farmers
harvested the biggest crops ever in 1994, swelling
66 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYinventories more than desired. To reduce the ex-
cess inventories, policymakers reined in acreage
in 1995, only to see another wet spring threaten to
trim crops and run down inventories again. Thus,
the ability of farm programs to stabilize food
production and reserves in the interest of food
security remains open to question.
Boost food demand. Because excess production
from the nation’s farms is a chronic problem, the
second traditional farm policy goal has been to
boost food demand to help eliminate excess sup-
plies. An increasingly important way to boost food
demand has been to provide food to low-income
consumers who do not otherwise have access to
high-quality diets.
3 Like programs aimed at food
security, programs designed to improve diets of
the economically disadvantaged are also moti-
vated by agriculture’s excess capacity.
The nation’s food and nutrition programs have
been assembled over several decades, but the in-
teresting part is that each program has been legis-
lated in the agriculture committees of Congress
and administered in the Department of Agricul-
ture. Programs like food stamps, school lunches,
and Women-Infants-and-Children all share a so-
cial objective of ensuring food security to low-
income consumers. Nevertheless, most of these
programs were created to boost demand for food
in a nation where supply has exceeded demand. To
be sure, the social objectives have been given
prominence in recent years, but the programs’ link
to agriculture remains.
Support and stabilize farm incomes. Since the
1930s, Congress has believed the federal govern-
ment must provide some level of income security
to the nation’s farmers. With a quarter of the
nation’s population living on farms in the 1930s,
shoring up farm incomes was seen as a way to
boost the national economy out of the Great De-
pression. In addition, programs to boost farm in-
comes were readily justified in the nation’s social
conscience since incomes of farm families aver-
aged about a third of nonfarm families (Chart 3).
Thus, it is easy to understand how support for farm
incomes became part of the New Deal. But the
goal has outlived the Depression.
An unwritten but important feature of farm in-
come programs has been the abiding belief that
boosting farm incomes will lead to rural develop-
ment. This was an obvious connection in the 1930s
when farmers populated rural America. The con-
nection is much more dubious today when only
one in five rural counties has an economy that
depends mainly on agriculture.
Preserve soil and water resources. The final
traditional goal of U.S. farm policy has been to
preserve the nation’s soil and water resources.
Born in the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, this goal is
closely related to the food security goal; by pre-
serving soil and water, the nation protects its long-
term ability to produce food. A happy coincidence
for policymakers is that conservation programs
also aid in controlling excess production. Such
programs have steered farmers into resource-con-
serving practices while retiring highly erodible
lands. The Conservation Reserve Program, now in
its tenth year, is the most recent manifestation of
this goal.
The new economy
Scrambling to find budget savings, Congress
will be forced to ask whether the legacy of farm
policy goals still holds. This question must be
answered in light of how the agricultural economy
has changed. Although changes in this dynamic
industry have been many, four major develop-
ments call into question past policy goals and the
policy instruments for achieving them.
The structure of agriculture has changed. Dur-
ing the past six decades, farming as a way of life
has given way to farming as a business, eroding
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 67agriculture’s unique nature and the justification
for its special policy treatment. The structure of
U.S. agriculture has shifted steadily toward bigger
and fewer farm businesses, with the number of
farms declining from nearly 7 million in the 1930s
to only 2 million today. As farms have grown
bigger, the incomes of farm families have ap-
proached and occasionally passed the incomes of
nonfarm families (Chart 3).
4 Thus, the industry’s
need for continued government support is being
questioned.
Farm programs aimed at supporting farm in-
come are based on the premise that a rising tide
lifts all farm boats. This premise was defensible in
the 1930s when farms were more or less the same
across the country. But the premise no longer
holds. A close look at who is getting farm pay-
ments points out the problem of emphasizing old
policy goals in a new farm economy.
Under one of the most expensive farm pro-
grams—commodity programs—cash payments
(known as deficiency payments) are made to grain
and cotton producers to make up the difference
between low market prices and specified target
prices. In exchange for these payments, produc-
ers agree to hold a portion of their land out of
production. Thus, deficiency payments simulta-
neously boost farm income and buy a measure of
40
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68 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYsupply control, curbing the industry’s excess pro-
duction problem.
Since one goal of the payments is to curb pro-
duction, they are skewed toward the nation’s
larger farms, which produce more but generally
are not in need of government assistance. A useful
way to look at the distribution of government
payments is to split today’s 2 million farms into
three size groups based on annual sales: small
farms (sales less than $100,000), medium-sized
commercial farms (sales between $100,000 and
$500,000), and large commercial farms (sales ex-
ceeding $500,000) (Table 1).
Small farms are by far the most numerous, com-
prising more than 80 percent of all farms (Chart
4). Most of these farms can be described as “life-
style” or “hobby” farms that rely primarily on
off-farm income. Thus despite their large number,
they generate less than a fourth of industry sales.
They also garner slightly more than a fourth of all
government farm payments, a share that is in rough
proportion to their share of industry sales but
disproportionately small relative to their number.
In contrast, medium-sized and large commercial
farms, which are far less numerous than small
farms, account for the lion’s share of industry
sales—and government payments. Medium-sized
farms, comprising about a sixth of all farms, pro-
duce about a third of industry sales, have an aver-
age net worth of nearly $750,000, and claimed
well over half of all government farm payments in
1993. Nearly three-fourths of medium-sized farms
received government payments, with an average
payment per farm of about $24,000.
Large farms are only 2.5 percent of the total
number of farms but produce over 40 percent of
industry sales. Moreover, they own an equity base
averaging nearly $2 million per farm. Many of the
biggest farms in this group produce livestock or
crops such as fruits and vegetables that do not earn
government payments. Still, nearly 60 percent of
large farms received government payments in
1993, with an average payment per farm of about
$65,000.
Thus, a picture emerges of a distribution of





Sales < $100,000 $100,000-500,000 > $500,000
Equity per farm $234,000 $746,000 $1,954,000
Percent receiving payments   30%   58%   72%
Average payment per farm $5,000 $24,000 $51,000
Source: Morehart and Perry; Economic Research Service; and authors’ calculations.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 69and financially stronger farms. How far the dis-
tribution is tipped, however, varies by farm type.
For example, large farms receive a bigger proportion
of government payments among cotton farms than
among wheat and feed grain farms. In 1993, the
average government payment to cotton farms,
which are generally larger than grain farms, was
over $39,000, more than double the average pay-
ment to grain farms. Only a fourth of the nation’s
cotton farms were small farms, which collected
only 7 percent of government payments to all cotton
farms (Chart 5). In contrast, roughly three-fourths
of wheat and feed grain farms were small farms,
which received more than a third of government
payments to all wheat and feed grain farms.
With a larger share of the nation’s farm output
coming from bigger, financially healthier farms,
the changed structure of agriculture casts doubt on
both the need to support all farm incomes and the
means of achieving that goal. Are there farms whose
income the public still wants to support? Perhaps,
but most of these families will benefit far more
from rural economic growth than from higher farm
prices. This suggests greater emphasis on rural
initiatives and less on traditional farm programs.
Agriculture is more industrial. The trend to
fewer, larger farms began decades ago. In recent
years, however, a revolution has taken shape that
could have an even greater bearing on the indus-
try’s structure and farm policy than the earlier shift
to bigger farms. The industry’s revolution is
sweeping farmers, food processors, seed companies,
and other agribusinesses into tighter marketing
arrangements, such as contract production and
vertical integration, changing the way the industry
does business in a fundamental way.
Chart 4







2.06 million farms $175.1 billion $13.4 billion Total:
FARM STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS, 1993
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affects farm policy decisions in three key ways.
First, the focus of the new industrialized agricul-
ture is on value-added products aimed at specific
market  niches. By following rigid production
guidelines, farmers are learning to produce raw
food products that meet food processors’ and con-
sumers’ stringent demands. Thus, traditional farm
policy, which retains a focus on generic commodi-
ties, is rapidly becoming outmoded.
Second, a more industrialized agriculture prom-
ises to add momentum to the long-standing shift
toward fewer, larger farms. Larger farms are the
most likely to benefit from contractual arrange-
ments to produce specialized products for food
companies. In contrast, smaller farms may face a
declining market for their generic production.
Thus, policymakers must decide if they wish to
continue supporting the incomes of larger farms
as their business arrangements with corporate ag-
ricultural businesses become increasingly inter-
twined.
Third, one of the main benefits of an industrial-
ized agriculture is that its tighter marketing arrange-
ments spread between farmers and agribusinesses
the traditional risks of marketing farm products.
As the industry’s risk profile changes, traditional
farm policies designed to stabilize farm produc-
tion and incomes may diminish in value. Instead,
policymakers may wish to strengthen the legal
framework for negotiating workable contracts be-
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 71Farm markets are international. We now take it
for granted that U.S. agriculture is part of a global
supermarket. Today, upward of a quarter of the
nation’s farm output is sold in export markets,
three times the amount sold overseas in the 1930s.
And the export share is much higher for many
commodities, such as wheat and soybeans.
But this clear shift to the world market has been
slow to influence U.S. farm policy. The reason lies
in the domestic orientation of our goals and the
policy instruments that have grown up around
them. From the start, farm policy has been a
domestic policy. In the wake of the Smoot-
Hawley tariffs in 1930, U.S. agriculture turned its
attention to the domestic market, much as other
sectors of the economy were doing then. It is not
surprising, therefore, that a key farm policy devel-
opment of the 1930s was to erect trade barriers
against food imports, special barriers that for some
items are still with us.
The domestic bias of farm programs creates
three problems for U.S. agriculture in interna-
tional markets. First, commodity programs can
price U.S. farmers out of the world market. Although
not a problem recently, in the early 1980s policy-
makers pushed crop price supports above world
market levels, contributing to the bust in farm
exports. Second, commodity programs reduce
U.S. agriculture’s ability to respond to world mar-
ket opportunities. By their design, commodity
programs create rigid cropping patterns that keep
farmers in the same crop—year in, year out. The
world market is not nearly so predictable. Thus,
U.S. farmers have continued to bet their farms on
selling more bulk commodities abroad, even as
demand has shifted to value-added products. 
Third, commodity programs hinder our com-
petitiveness in world markets. The programs re-
quire U.S. farmers to idle productive acres, but
when they cut back production, farmers in other
nations plant more acres. Moreover, by locking
farmers into traditional production patterns, com-
modity programs may also discourage production
of crops for value-added products, the most prom-
ising part of the world food market.
U.S. agricultural policy, therefore, needs a
greater international focus. The realities of the
world marketplace call into question the goal of
supporting domestic prices and the means of doing
so—acreage reduction programs.
The rural economy is now more diversified. A
fundamental premise of agricultural policy from
the 1930s to the present has been that farm policy
is rural policy. In the 1930s, when nearly a fourth
of the nation’s population lived on farms and
produced about a tenth of the nation’s GDP, farm
policy affected a big slice of the nation’s economy.
But as the U.S. economy has moved from agrarian,
to industrial, to post-industrial, the role of agri-
culture has diminished. Today, less than 2 percent
of the population live on farms and produce less
than 2 percent of GDP. The decline in agriculture’s
role in the economy is clearly reflected in the
changing economic profile of rural America. From
1950 to 1990, for example, the number of rural
counties that depend on agriculture as their lead-
ing industry fell from more than 2,000 to around
550 (Figure 1). 
Despite large expenditures on farm programs
over the past decade, the rural economy overall
has been relatively weak. Since 1980, only a quar-
ter of the nation’s 2,400-odd rural counties have
had above-average economic performance. Rural
economic winners tend to fall into three catego-
ries: counties with emerging commercial and fi-
nancial centers, counties adjacent to metropolitan
areas, and counties with scenic amenities. 
Almost all farm-dependent counties have had
subpar economic growth in recent years. Con-
solidation in production agriculture and the
move toward industrialization have weakened
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munities. Higher farm income in the late 1980s, for
instance, did not spark general economic gains in
most farm-dependent communities. Thus, farm
programs are bringing few economic gains to
most rural counties. To the extent that the nation
retains goals for rural America, another approach
seems advisable.
POLICY GOALS FOR THE FUTURE
It is not prudent for the nation to pursue an
old-goal policy in a new agricultural economy,
especially when such a policy costs more than our
federal budget will permit. The question is, what
should be our policy goals for the future? Review-
ing past policy and the industry’s future suggests
four goals. Together, these goals have the added
benefit of requiring considerably less government
involvement than in the past. 
Enhance international competitiveness
The first public policy goal should be to enhance
U.S. agriculture’s international competitiveness.
The industry has great potential to widen its pres-
ence in foreign markets. Gains made there will
help to turn around the nation’s unfavorable
current account deficit. Three steps will further
this goal.
First, current programs that deter competitive-
ness should be eliminated. Commodity programs
should be phased out over a multiyear period.
Eliminating the programs will allow agriculture to
use its full productive capacity, encourage produc-
ers to seek market opportunities, and lower the
costs of value-added products. A phase-out period
will provide farmers time to adjust their decisions.
Export assistance programs, such as export subsidies
and credits, should be given a top-to-bottom re-
view to ensure that the programs are aimed at
developing market opportunities.
Second, agricultural research programs should
be given a thorough review. The nation has an
excellent publicly funded agricultural research
system. Commodity programs have no doubt in-
fluenced the direction of this system, just as they
have influenced the decisions of farmers. As inter-
national markets have moved away from bulk
commodities toward value-added products, it is
not clear that the research system has kept pace.
Public research should lead U.S. agriculture as it
diversifies into more food market niches.
Third, attention should be given to the public’s
role in providing information on foreign markets.
The Department of Agriculture has an enormous
information machine. But much of that informa-
tion is aimed at traditional commodities, and much
of it may not be needed anymore. In addition,
U.S. agriculture needs more information on the
products foreign consumers are buying. In short,
an updated mission is needed to guide the De-
partment’s information programs, one that can
be met with a smaller budget.
Improve the nation’s diet
The second public policy goal should be to
improve the nation’s diet. The public has an over-
riding stake in the health and nutrition of Amer-
ica’s citizens. The links between diet and health
have never been more clear. As the price tag of the
nation’s health care system continues to mount,
improving the nation’s diet offers one of the best
ways to enhance health and cut cost. Public policy
should embrace these goals and take steps to en-
sure that agriculture supports them.
The nation’s long menu of food programs
should be reviewed to ensure that they provide
food and nutrition benefits. The Women-Infants-
and-Children program, for example, has paid con-
siderable social dividends because it couples
nutrition counseling with food benefits (U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office). Not all programs do.
74 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYThe nation’s interests in food safety and nutrition
need to be balanced. The media encourage a preoc-
cupation with food-borne pathogens. But the far
greater public interest lies in encouraging the nation
to eat a healthier diet. Medical researchers estimate
that approximately 9,000 people die each year from
food-borne pathogens such as salmonella and E.
Coli (McGinnis and Foege). By comparison, the
Surgeon General reported in 1988 that poor diet
contributes to an estimated 35 percent of the
nation’s 400,000 to 500,000 deaths from cancer each
year (U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices).
5 Thus, while the nation’s dated food inspec-
tion laws clearly need an overhaul, the need for an
effective nutrition education campaign is para-
mount.
Improving the nation’s diet will also require
sending the right signals to farmers. Market grades
and standards, the rules that govern many farm
product markets, will need to match the im-
proved diets that many consumers are now choos-
ing. Instead, many current grades and standards
are still aimed at a more traditional diet.
Conserve the nation’s natural resources
The third public policy goal should be to fur-
ther encourage agriculture to conserve its natural
resources. This goal endures and, if anything, has
gained support with time. While the support is
widely voiced, it remains unclear how much
Americans want to spend on conservation programs.
The Conservation Reserve Program is a good
case in point. Established in 1985 at the depths of
the 1980s farm recession, the program has retired
more than 36 million acres at a cost of roughly $20
billion. The nation was willing to spend that
amount when farm bankruptcies were common-
place. Indeed, the goal of supporting farmers’ in-
come may have overridden conservation goals.
Many productive acres ended up in the program
while many erodible acres did not. Now, the pro-
gram is up for renewal at a time when a $2-billion-
a-year price tag stands out; no one expects expendi-
tures to continue at this level. In the main, however,
the willingness to pay for conservation programs
when agriculture is not in crisis is largely untested.
Increase rural economic opportunity
The fourth goal of public policy should be to
increase economic opportunity in rural America.
Although market forces will ultimately determine
how much and where the rural economy grows,
the public has an abiding interest in making sure
that rural resources are used to their full capacity.
In some cases, this may require efforts to help
those resources relocate elsewhere. In other cases,
it may mean making investments in rural America
similar to investments we make in our cities. In all
cases, it will mean broadening our approach to
rural America beyond farm policy alone.
Three topics will dominate the rural economic
discussion in the period ahead. Public investments
in rural education will take on greater interest, as
steps are considered to help rural schools broaden
their curricula and access distant information and
resources. Public spending on infrastructure will
be hotly debated, as issues like fiber optic net-
works test whether we will emphasize invest-
ments in people or places. Finally, new programs
may be considered to enhance capital markets for
rural businesses. Historically, public attention to
rural credit has been dominated by agriculture.
The result is that most farmers have more credit
choices than their rural business neighbors. While
the rural credit market does not need an infusion of
subsidized credit, it would benefit from steps to
enhance competition and enlarge access to capital
markets—the same steps that have worked well
for agriculture.
Reconciling past and future goals
The list of four goals outlined above omits two
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 75prominent traditional goals—guaranteeing a secure
food supply and supporting and stabilizing farm
incomes. Having been policy mainstays for so
long, does deemphasizing them pose any policy
problems?
As already noted, food security has been a farm
policy goal more on paper than in practice. With
a highly productive agriculture and well-estab-
lished agricultural markets, it is difficult to argue
that food security remains a serious risk to U.S.
consumers. Moreover, U.S. consumers can readily
tap what has become an efficient global food
market. Shortages in one part of the world quickly
elicit additional supplies from other parts of the
world.
What may be a greater risk to U.S. consumers is
the prospect of less stability in food prices. In the
past, the government held grain stocks because
they were the natural consequence of the com-
modity programs aimed at supporting farm in-
come, not because there was an explicit strategy
of stabilizing food prices. Over time, these stock-
piles helped stabilize commodity and food prices.
Looking ahead, the government will accumulate
fewer grain stocks as farm program budgets are
cut. This will happen during a period when sci-
entists believe that greater fluctuation in global
weather patterns could make agricultural produc-
tion more volatile. In short, consumer food prices
could be more volatile in the period ahead than
over the past decade.
6 Thus, it would be wise to
reexamine the nation’s grain reserve policy, the
primary goal of which should be to maintain pru-
dent buffer stocks.
The new structure of agriculture greatly dimin-
ishes the need for income support programs, but
some may argue the government should continue
programs that stabilize farm incomes in light of
the risks of uncertain weather in agricultural pro-
duction. While such an argument may have been
convincing in the past, today there are manifold
market mechanisms that enable farmers to man-
age such risk, a conclusion confirmed by a na-
tional summit conference on risk management
held last year (Commodity Futures Trade Com-
mission). Farmers can hedge price risk through
many futures and options contracts, and a newly
traded contract may provide a tool to manage
fluctuations in crop yields.
One of the greatest challenges in reconciling
past agricultural policy with a new vision will be
managing the transition from old goals to new
ones. The end of traditional farm commodity pro-
grams will clearly hurt some farmers. One of the
most closely watched impacts will be possible
declines in farmland values. Farmland values will
not fall uniformly across the nation, and the size
of the decline will depend on many factors beyond
the level of government payments—world export
demand and long-term interest rates, in particular.
Agriculture’s balance sheet appears to be strong
enough to withstand the modest to moderate re-
ductions in land values that might occur. Given the
potential impacts of a policy transition on farmers,
it would be prudent to phase out commodity pro-
grams over a multiyear period to give farmers time
to adjust.
Encouraging U.S. agriculture to take full advan-
tage of market opportunities will be critical to
a successful policy transition. It is worth noting
that some of the most profitable segments of
U.S. agriculture have not relied on government
programs. Many producers of fruit, vegetables,
and livestock products have prospered by grow-
ing what consumers want, not what government
programs require. Removing program restric-
tions, therefore, could unlock new market oppor-
tunities for producers of traditional program
crops. Public information and education programs
could play a useful role in highlighting such
opportunities. 
The adjustment to market opportunities will not
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regions, such as the eastern Corn Belt, will have
many production and marketing choices and
may adjust quickly. Producers in some other re-
gions, such as the Great Plains, will have fewer
options and may face a longer transition period.
These regional differences will pose a nettle-
some problem for policymakers, perhaps requir-
ing greater attention to regional disparities than in
the past.
While there will be transition costs from moving
to a new agricultural policy, there will also be
substantial benefits. In the long term, consumers,
producers, and rural residents all stand to gain
from a policy focused on international markets,
nutrition, natural resources, and the rural economy.
Agricultural exports will increase. Improved diets
will reduce health care costs and boost the produc-
tivity of workers. Agriculture’s resource base will
be used in a sustainable, efficient manner. And
rural economic growth will improve. Short-run
costs of adjustment should not prevent a policy
that holds the promise of such long-term dividends.
CONCLUSIONS
The chances for major reform in agricultural
policy are greater now than they have been in
many years. Although many in agriculture may
prefer the status quo, a new budget imperative is
forcing a rethinking of what should be spent and
why. Economic changes also point to revolution—
if not in 1995, then in the not-too-distant future.
Pursuing a policy of outdated goals for a new
agricultural economy is simply not prudent, and
no such policy can continue indefinitely.
U.S. agriculture has a bright future, but public
policy needs to support that future. Policy should
enable the industry to compete effectively in the
world food market. It should try to improve the
nation’s diet, bringing the interests of farmers and
consumers into full alignment. Policy should con-
tinue to encourage wise conservation practices.
And finally, it should create new opportunities in
rural America, recognizing that rural economic
challenges transcend agriculture alone.
ENDNOTES
1 Paarlberg suggests that agriculture’s unique character
“manifested itself in many ways, not least in the political
process. Farmers were the most numerous group in the
economy. Their spokesmen held the political initiative and
controlled the farm policy agenda,” p. 6.
2 For example, some 30 years ago, Earl Heady, one of the
nation’s foremost agricultural economists, and his colleagues
wrote, “But after 30 years the problems of United States
agriculture remain basically unchanged. The supply of farm
commodities is still large in relation to how much consumers
desire; it is still large in relation to what consumers are willing
to pay for it.”
3 Some analysts argue, for example, that food and nutrition
programs for the economically disadvantaged have taken
precedence over government grain reserves as a means of
promoting food security (Zulauf).
4 Several factors account for the relative gain in farm family
incomes, including agriculture’s technological gains,
enlargement of farm businesses, and increased off-farm
earnings of farm families.
5 Although no similar estimates are available for coronary
heart disease, a significant portion of the nation’s 700,000 to
800,000 deaths due to heart disease are believed to be linked
to poor diet.
6 A study by the Council for Agricultural Science and
Technology concluded that the future climate is more uncertain
than in the past, and that a grain stocks policy is an effective
tool in managing any resulting changes in production
(Council for Agricultural Science and Technology).
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